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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U T A H 
J. E, BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH v 
E. BAGNALL, and FLOEENCE I 
BAGNALL, I 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, I 
I Case No. 
vs. / 13753 
SUBUEBIA LAND COMPANY, an \ 
Idaho Corporation, et al., I 
Defendants and Counter Appellants. I 
Brief of Defendants*Appellants 
NATTJEE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action to forfeit a real estate 
agreement for alleged failure to make the required in-
stallments, and to quiet title to some 570 acres of land in 
the plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWEE COUET 
The Court denied the defendants' motion for judg-
ment on the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, 
and granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and 
against the defendants forfeiting the real estate agree-
ment and quieting title in the plaintiffs, except for an 
undivided % interest in 140.15 acres, which the court, by 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title, awarded 
to United Paint and Colors. Plaintiffs' appeal from the 
order is also pending before this honorable court. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants (defendants) seek reversal of the Judg-
ment of forfeiture and seek to have judgment entered in 
their favor dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff and 
reinstating the contract. Defendants further seek to have 
the matter remanded back to the District Court for a de-
termination of damages, adjustments and offsets due de-
fendants from the plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1, 1952, a real estate agreement was 
entered into between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall, 
as sellers, and Wallace J. Nyberg, Jean B. Nyberg, and 
Grlenna A. Nyberg, as buyers. The agreement appears to 
have been part of an overall settlement of the estate of 
Hannah Bagnall, with th apparent motive being to divide 
up the estate at that time, and, as it later turned out, to 
avoid a probate. Jean Nyberg, step daughter to Hannah, 
and one of the purchasers under the agreement, was the 
owner in fee apart from any interest acquired under the 
contract, of .57 acres on which one of the two homes on the 
property were located, by virtue of a warranty deed dated 
January 20, 1939, from Joseph and Hannah Bagnall, 
(Abstract P. 112.) She was also the owner of an un-
divided % interest in 140.15 acres of the land covered 
by the real estate agreement. She held that interest as 
co-tenant with her brother, J. B. Bagnall, by virtue of a 
warranty deed dated January 30, 1939, by which Joseph 
F. Bagnall and Hannah Bagnall conveyed to the plain-
tiff, J. B. Bagnall, and to his sister, Jean B. Nyberg, an 
undivided one-half interest in the said 140.15 acres. (B. 
2 
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55, 56) The real estate agreement also provided that J ean 
had been given a $32,000 interest out of Hannah's share, 
leaving a balance of $80,000 equally divided between the 
two sellers Hannah and J R. Bagnall. 
The real estate agreement was subsequently assigned 
to various parties, until it was acquired by Suburbia 
Land Company of Idaho in July, 1962. At that time, a 
modification agreement was entered into between J I.* 
Bagnall and his wife, Fiorenee as 11M- f i l e r s , and > « 
burbia Land Company as Mi.* Mi^-r, 1M modification 
agreement incorporated the original September 1, 1952, 
agreement and made certain modifications therein. 
Among other changes, the sellers agreed to place a war-
ranty deed conveying good and marketable title, !•»• 
gether wiib nil shares of water stock owned by them, in 
escrow at tin- hank of Ephraim. They also agreed ;«» 
deliver to the defendants an ur> io date abstract il;.b soon 
as possible", and to clear up any del'eeis that may he 
shown in the title within 18 months from the date of the 
modification agreement. The defendants herein contend 
that the sellers were to render a title opinion " a s soon 
afc nos -ah le" ' a !su 
un Aiareii o, 1962, 4 and '% months prior ;<* u.. 
assignment to Suburbia and the execution of the modiii-
cation agreement, JeaiiNyberg, by warranty deed, deeded 
the aforementioned 140.15 acres ai-i In- .•! acres to 
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation (E. 72) 
Tin* deed purported to convey a fee .simple title t»> a.i 
.;;" ii(.- land. Ah-. Xyberg held the Su acres (upon which 
the main residence was located) in fee, l»iit had uniy an 
3 
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undivided one-half interest in the 140.15 acres. The milk-
ing barn, tack room, corrals, and the bulk of all other 
improvements, with the exception of the two residences, 
were located on the 140.15 acre tract. 
On October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land conveyed 
those same interests, by warranty deed, to United Paint 
and Colors Company, one of the defendants named in 
plaintiffs' amended, amended complaint. An order of 
Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was 
granted in favor of United Paint & Colors Company on 
March 26, 1974, by the above entitled court, thereby 
effectively depriving the defendants of a % interest in 
the central part of the ranch containing 70% of the 
improvements. The matter of the .57 acres has not yet 
been litigated. 
One of the major concerns of Suburbia as buyer was 
the ability of the sellers to deliver an unclouded title. 
The sellers agreed to take upon themselves the burden of 
preparing an abstract and clearing any defects in the 
title. It was the contention of the buyers that sellers were 
to render the title opinion also. That contention was dis-
puted by the plaintiffs at the trial. In any event, the 
Modification Agreement (which consisted of the Agree-
ment dated July 16, 1962, in conjunction with a letter 
from seller to buyer dated July 18, 1962), (Exhibits P. 
5 and P. 6), provided that the sellers were to complete 
their obligations within 18 months. The abstract was not 
completed until sometime in 1965, according to testimony 
elicited from the plaintiffs and their former attorney, 
and was never delivered to the defendants. 
4 
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Plaintiffs took no action to clear any defects, main-
taining that they had an unclouded title, even to the 
140.15 and the .57 acres, and that it was fully marketable 
and complied with their obligations under the Real Estate 
Agreement and the Modification Agreement. Throughout 
much of 1962 and through 1965, at least, Mr. Maxfield 
made constant and repeated efforts to obtain the ab-
stract from the plaintiffs or their attorney, Don V. 
Tibbs. Beginning in 1963, and continuing throughout 
1965, Mr. Maxfield advised the plaintiffs of numerous 
title deficiencies. He advised them of claims made by 
third parties to the 140.15 acres which Jean Nyberg had 
deeded away. (Defendants were not then aware of the 
problem with the .57 acres). He advised them of claims 
made by a Mr. Don Powell to a 63 acre tract and to a 
76.94 acres tract, and so forth. I t was undisputed that 
Maxfield obtained deeds from Mr. Powell, that he deeded 
the property therein to the Bagnalls, and that they, in 
turn deeded it back to Suburbia of Nevada (one of the 
successor corporations). There was dispute at the trial 
as to the reasons therefore, and the effect thereof. De-
fendants maintained that it was to clear up some of the 
title defects and that plaintiffs agreed to a moratorium 
on payments until December, 1971. Plaintiffs disagreed 
with that contention, denying that there had been any 
moratorium. 
During much of this time, and especially beginning 
in 1964, the defendants were not making all of their pay-
ments. I t was their contention that many of those pay-
ments were missed with the approval of the plaintiffs be-
cause of their failure to obtain the abstract and to clear 
5 
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up the title defects. Also, the plaintiffs were in default. 
As stated, they did not obtain the abstract until 1965. They 
did not deliver it to the defendants. They did not render a 
title opinion. They did not have all of the water stock in 
the escrow as agreed until 1973! Joseph Albert Bagnall, 
son of the plaintiff, is the owner of record of approximate-
ly 5.56 acres of the ground. The Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railway is the owner in fee simple of a strip 1 
chain by 40 chains along the eastern boundary and has an 
easement containing along the balance of the eastern 
boundary of the ranch, all taking about 3 acres. There 
is a county road running through the middle of the ranch 
not mentioned in the contract or the warranty deed con-
suming 2 acres. Defendants allege a private easement 
consuming about one acre also runs through the ranch and 
is not mentioned in any of the conveyances or agreements. 
On April 25,1962, suit was commenced to forfeit the 
agreement and a lis pendens was recorded. That lis pen-
dens has not been removed of record and constitutes a 
cloud on the title. On February 18,1970, plaintiff entered 
into an oil and gas lease to Phillips Petroleum which in-
cluded all of the property contemplated in the Real Estate 
Agreement (which even included the property belong-
ing to J. A. Bagnall and 17.54 acres of land which the 
buyers had purchased outright at the time of the signing 
of the modification agreement in 1962), wherein they 
purported to lease all of the oil and gas rights to the 
property, as well as all of the water rights with the ex-
ception of well waters. This, of course, constituted a 
deliberate cloud upon the title, even though Phillips prob-
ably could not prevail in a suit with the buyers. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
During the latter part of June, 1969, it became appar-
ent to Reed R. Maxfield, then president of Suburbia 
Land Company, of Utah, that the plaintiff could not 
comply with their agreement and were about to attempt 
forfeiture of the contract. On July 5, 1969, Mr. Maxfield, 
acting on behalf of Suburbia, made a written tender to 
plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, of "any and all amounts that are 
due . . . under the terms of . . . (the) real estate con-
tract." As part of that tender, Suburbia asked the plain-
tiffs to tell them how much was due. There were no re-
strictions or conditions attached to the tender. Plaintiffs 
rejected the tender and asked, instead, not for the de-
linquencies due under the contract, but demanded, the 
full accelerated balance due in two separate letters. There 
was no provision in the contract for an acceleration. De-
fendants again tendered, in writing, payment of the 
delinquencies, without acceleration, and asked the plain-
tiffs to set forth the amount. That tender was never ac-
cepted by the plaintiffs either. 
Within a few days of the July 5 tender, Mr. and Mrs. 
Bagnall went to the Maxfield's house on the ranch at 
Chester. They testified that they came to accept the 
tender (a position wholly contrary to their stipulation 
that they never accepted the tender), while the defend-
ants testified that they were told by the Bagnalls at that 
time that they did not want the money, they were de^ -
termined to take the ranch back. 
On July 31,1970, a notice of default was served upon 
Reed R. Maxfield, demanding the whole of the acceler-
ated balance due under the agreement, together with 
interest and penalties in an unspecified amount, and 
7 
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taxes. Lester Romero, then president of Suburbia of Utah, 
the only surviving corporation, was advised of the notice 
and contacted plaintiffs attorney, Merlin 0 . Baker, and 
once again tendered payment in writing of all amounts 
actually due on the contract and asked the plaintiffs to 
specify the amount due. The trial court ruled this tender 
to be timely and within the time allotted by the plaintiffs 
in their notice of forfeiture. The notice of forfeiture was 
obviously in error, having asked for the accelerated bal-
ance ($48,535.70 plus taxes and interest) contrary to the 
provisions of the contract. There were various letters 
back and forth thereafter, Suburbia each time tendering 
payment of the delinquencies. Plaintiffs refused to 
acknowledge that Suburbia of Utah, or Lester Romero, 
had anything to do with the agreement and proceeded 
with suit against the Idaho corporation filed about No-
vember 4, 1970. It was not until October, 1971, that the 
Nevada and Utah corporations, together with Lester R. 
Romero were joined as defendants. 
Then on August 19, 1971, the plaintiffs completely 
reversed themselves, repudiated the contract, (and, de-
fendants believe, waived their notice of default) by mail-
ing a Notice to Quit to the defendants Maxfield, advis-
ing them that the Modification Agreement was void and 
that they were considered tenants at will and giving them 
five days to quit the premises. 
On December 1, 1971, defendants delivered to the 
escrow, the Bank of Ephraim, a regular monthly pay-
ment for $400.00, which sum the bank accepted, receipted, 
and posted to interest on December 1, 1971. I t should be 
noted that the plaintiffs had never notified the escrow 
8 
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of their notice of forfeiture. It is the defendants' posi-
tion that the acceptance of this payment, after notice of 
default effectively waived the default and the contract 
must be re-instated, if, indeed, it was ever in doubt. 
After many motions and countermotions. After long 
and involved pre-trial hearings, and after much pain and 
suffering on both sides, the trial herein commenced in 
the Sanpete County Courthouse on April 22, 1974, be-
fore the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge pro-tem. It 
is from the results of that trial that defendants take this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER 
THE TERMS OF THE MODIFICATION 
AGREEMENT AND MUST CORRECT 
THEIR OWN DEFAULTS BEFORE THEY 
CAN DEFAULT THE DEFENDANTS 
FAILURE TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN 
MARKETABLE TITLE. The testimony and evidence 
produced by the defendants at the trial that plaintiffs 
did not have title to all of the land, and could not con-
vey according to the tenor of the Modification Agree-
ment, and the Warranty Deed, stands uncontroverted. 
The testimony of Jackson Wanless (T-354) shows that 
the railroad right of way encroaches 33 feet along the 
entire east side of the ranch taking three acres (T-353); 
that a minimum of two acres is taken up by county 
roads (T-356), and one acre is consumed by a private 
easement. Whether the private easement exists was sub-
ject to some dispute. The other matters are uncontro-
verted. A reading of the Real Estate Agreement (Ex-
9 
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hibit P-4), the Modification Agreement and the letter 
of July 18 (Exhibits P-5 & 6), and the Warranty Deed 
placed into the escrow (Exhibit P-7) reveal that noth-
ing was said about the railroad, the county roads, or the 
private easement. 
The Modification Agreement provided as follows: 
"The Sellers agree to place a Warranty Deed 
conveying good and marketable title to the prem-
ises as described in said Agreement, together with 
all shares of water stock owned by them in Escrow 
at the Bank of Ephraim, Utah.' V 
They placed the warrnaty deed in the escrow, but 
there was no mention in either the deed or the modifica-
tion agreement of the railroad, the county road, or the 
private easement. In addition, and even more import-
antly, there was no mention of an undivided % interest 
in 140.15 acres of the land contemplated by the agree-
ment which plaintiffs could not convey. As heretofore 
stated in the statement of facts, Jean B. Nyberg, one 
of the purchasers under the terms of the September 1, 
1952, agreement, had, apart from any interest under the 
agreement, an undivided % interest in 140.15 acres con-
tained in the agreement. This 140.15 acres contains vir-
tually all of the improvements on the ranch, with the 
exception of the two homes. (See testimony of Eeed 
Maxfield, T-325, & Exhibit D-38). On March 3, 1962, 
prior to the assignment of the contract to defendants, 
Mrs. Nyberg, by warranty deed, conveyed the same 
140.15 acres to Utah Valley Land and Development 
Corporation. Utah Valley subsequently conveyed by war-
ranty deed to United Paint and Colors, a Utah corpora-
tion. The trial court ruled that this constituted a de-
fect upon the title, that plaintiffs had not cleared the 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defect prior to the notice of default, and that the de-
fendants were entitled to damages therefore. (Pre-trial 
order, pages 6 and 7, paragraph 12, R-....). Further-
more, the trial court granted a summary judgment quiet-
ing title to an undivided % interest thereto in United 
Paint and Colors, effectively depriving both the vendors 
and the purchasers of any interest therein. 
In February, 1970, prior to service of the notice of 
default, plaintiffs leased the oil and gas and water 
rights to the property. The trial court ruled this a de-
fect for which defendants were entitled to damages. 
J. B. Bagnall testified that he had a son named 
Joseph A. Bagnall (T-7), and that he (J. R. Bagnall) 
had never used that name. He was then shown Exhibit 
D-22, a warranty deed wherein plaintiffs, J. R. Bagnall 
and Florence Bagnall deeded the ranch property to 
themselves as tenants in common. The deed, however, 
recites that Joseph R. Bagnall is also known as J. A. 
Bagnall, and the said J. A. Bagnall purports to be a 
grantor. On page 9 of the transcript, Mr. Bagnall ad-
mits that " possibly Joseph should have signed this toa. 
I don't know. I have never used the name Joseph A. 
Bagnall. That is sacred to my son." On page 14, read-
ing from the deposition of J. R. Bagnall, the following 
colloquy took place concerning the interest of Joseph 
Albert Bagnall in the property, and the reason for the 
deed: 
"A Answer: 'He had interest in approximately 
two acres or two point something acres, and in 
order to make this so that we could make a clear 
transaction — if this was ever completed, that 
he deeded that to myself so that to clear the title 
so that we could furnish clear title to —' " 
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" Q Then the quest ion: 'To whom!' 
" A iTo whom?' Answer: 'To whoever paid for 
this contract, if and when this was ever paid for. 
That was part of clearing up the —' Then I 
should have said ti t les. ' ' 
On page 34 of volume 105 of the abstract (Exhibit 
P-8), we find a deed from Mary Ellen Allred aka Mary 
Ellen Acord to Joseph A. Bagnall, deeding three small 
pieces of property located in the Moroni Meadows (a 
par t of the ranch) containing a total of 2.5 acres. This 
is undoubtedly the property referred to by plaintiff as 
belonging to his son. The abstract shows that even today, 
the said property is still in the name of Joseph A. Bag-
nall, and hence constitutes a defect in the title. 
On page 37 of the abstract, under date of Decem-
ber 31, 1952, Frank D. and Faun T. Acord deed to 
Joseph A. Bagnall three pieces of property located in 
the Moroni Meadows. The acreage of the first tract is 
unspecified but clearly contains approximately 3.5 acres. 
The next two tracts contain 3.44, and 2.06 acres respec-
tively. J . A. Bagnall subsequently conveyed the 3.44 
acre tract to the plaintiffs, but the remaining two tracts 
containing approximately 5.56 acres remain in the name 
of J . A. Bagnall, constituting a defect in plaintiffs' title. 
On page 183 the abstract contains a notice of lis 
pendens dated April 25, 1962, stating that an action had 
been commenced in the Sanpete County Court by J. E. 
Bagnall and Florence Bagnall, against Wallace J . Ny-
berg, Jean B. Nyberg, Darwin Nyberg, Grlenna A. Ny-
berg, Donald W. Denton, Edwin N. Mortinson, Mr. and 
Mrs. Guy Eedmond, Virgil Eedmond, and Waldo Harr is 
as defendants for the purpose of terminating the 1952 
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real estate agreement and recovering possession of the 
lands covered thereby. That lis pendens has never been 
released. 
Parcel number 11 as described in the real estate 
agreement (Exhibit P-4) is owned of record by Caroline 
M. Hansen, Eva Josephen Hansen, and Mark Sharp 
Hansen. There is no conveyance of record by which the 
plaintiffs obtained title to that 1.5 acres. 
Thirty-three feet of the entire eastern boundary of 
the property is subject to the rights granted under a 
•"Eight of Way Warranty Deed" from Lars R. Chris-
tensen et, ux., to SanPete Valley Railway Company dated 
July 11, 1896. This same "easement ' ' was discussed 
above, but it appears that rather than merely an ease-
ment, a fee simple interest was conveyed by the deed, 
together with the right of the railway to encroach upon 
the adjoining lands for the purpose of building and con-
structing a roadbed and railway. The assets of SanPete 
Valley Railway Company were subsequently acquired 
by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 
All of these defects in the title are substantial and 
material. There appears to be no way in which plain-
tiffs can acquire clear title thereto. Even if they can, 
it is their obligation to do so, and until they have done 
so, defendants are not obligated, under pain of default, 
to continue making their payments, at least not until 
a determination has been made of the damages suffered 
by the defendants. 
In the case of MacLeodd vs. Hamilton, 236 N.W. 
912 (Mich. 1931), the plaintiff vendor attempted to fore-
close a land contract for default in the payment of in-
stallment payments and taxes. The buyer defended on 
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the ground (among others) that the seller did not have 
clear title by virtue of an easement for a drain granted 
to the county in 1876. The court dismissed the com-
plaint and held that, even though the easement had, 
in all probability, been abandoned by the county and 
constituted an easily removable cloud on the title, the 
seller must clear the defect from the record before he 
could default the vendee, and before he could bring suit 
or foreclosure. The Court said: 
"The mere record of the outstanding ease-
ment is sufficient to command assurances to de-
fendant against the contingencies of a lawsuit. 
Piatt vs. Newman, 71 Mich. 112, 38 N.W. 720. The 
easement is undoubtedly moribund, and under 
the evidence constitutes no justification for re-
scission by defendant, but does require plaintiff, 
before exacting performance by defendant, to be 
in a position to tender a marketable title. The 
plaintiff can remove the cloud, now of record, 
and file a new bill to foreclose/' 
In other words, even though the cloud was, at most, 
merely technical and easily removable, the vendor must 
remove it before he can default the buyer and foreclose. 
The sellers (Bagnalls) claimed they were aware of 
all of these defects (according to their own testimony), 
including the interest of Jean Nyberg, at the time of 
the making of the modification agreement. Yet they 
made no mention thereof in any of the descriptions — 
neither in the agreements nor in the warranty deed. The 
implied covenants in the September 1, 1952, agreement, 
and the modification agreement, that they could con-
vey a fee simple title to all of the land, and especially 
the warranties contained in the warranty deed that they 
conveyed and warranted a fee simple without reserva-
tion, is binding upon the plaintiffs. 
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57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth the 
covenants that are a part of the warranty deed: 
"Such deed when executed . . . (Constitutes 
conveyance) with covenants from the grantor . . . 
that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that 
he has good right to convey the same; that he 
guarantees . . . the quiet possession thereof; that 
the premises are free from all encumbrances . . . " 
57-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be in-
tended to pass by a conveyance of real estate, 
unless it appears from the conveyance that a les-
ser estate was intended." (Emphasis added) 
In Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924), 
the vendee sued the vendor for breach of the warranties 
and the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Vendor, by war-
ranty deed, had conveyed land, some of which he ap-
parently did not own, although the proper boundaries 
were clearly marked on the property, and vendee ap-
parently had knowledge of the actual boundaries at the 
time he accepted the deed. The vendee conceded that 
he had been excluded from only a small area. The court 
held that, nevertheless, the warranties in the deed would 
control, and plaintiff was awarded damages for the prop-
erty from which he was excluded. The importance of 
Van Cott, so far as Bagnall vs. Suburbia is concerned, 
is that the warranties cover known defects as well as 
unknown. Bagnall must clear the easements and other 
title defects even if defendants knew about them before 
he can default the defendants. Compare also Leavitt vs. 
Blohm, 357 P.2d 190 (Utah 1960); Creason vs. Peterson, 
24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 402 (Utah 1970); Schiff vs. 
Dixon (Okla. 1951), 227 P.2d 639; Piatt vs. Newman 
(Mich. 1888), 38 N.W. 720. 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in construing the 
effect of a statute outlining the warranties and effect of 
a warranty deed similar to the one in effect in Utah stated: 
" I f a deed contains an assurance to the pur-
chaser that the grantors have the very estate in 
quality which they purport to convey, and in 
fact the grantors have a lesser estate, such cove-
• • nant is considered broken as of the time of exe-
cution and delivery of the conveyance." Emphasis 
added. 
The defendants had sought to rely upon a statement 
in 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Sec. 69, asserting that the 
covenants were prospective in nature and could only be 
broken by an eviction. The court rejected that argu-
ment upon the ground that the statute (57-1-3 and 57-1-13 
in Utah) superseded the common law and was controlling. 
Whereupon the court said: 
"Covenants of 'seisn' and 'good right to con-
vey' are synonymous, and, if broken at all, are 
broken when made, and an actual eviction is un-
necessary to consumate the breach." Emphasis 
added. 
" I n an action for breach of the covenants of 
seisin and good right to convey, an eviction need 
not be alleged; but it is sufficient in charging a 
breach to negative the words of the covenants gend-
er ally." Emphasis added. 
And finally, in the case of Greason vs. Peterson, 24 
Utah 2d 305 (1970), 470 P.2d 403, the Utah court held 
that "There is a breach of warranty when it is shown 
that the grantor did not own the land that he purported 
to convey by warranty deed description; it is not neces-
sary to show an actual eviction or threat thereof." What 
more can be added!! 
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FAILURE TO TENDER ABSTRACT AS RE-
QUIRED BY THE LETTER OF JULY 18, 1962. On 
page 5 of the pre-trial order, the trial court found, as 
a matter of law, that the July 18, 1962, letter from J. R. 
Bagnall to Suburbia Land Company constituted a part 
of the modification agreement. It was also stipulated 
in the pre-trial order that the abstract was never de-
livered to the defendants prior to the institution of the 
lawsuit herein. The letter provided as follows (Exhibit 
P-6): 
"So also, the undersigned agree to clear up 
any defects that may be shown in the title con-
cerning the property as set forth in the Modifi-
cation Agreement within 18 months from date, it 
being understood that the abstract shall be exam-
ined and a Title Opinion rendered as soon as 
possible." 
The testimony of both Mr. Bagnall and Don V. 
Tibbs was to the effect that it was the sellers obligation 
to render the abstract, that it was not even completed 
until sometime in 1965, and was never delivered. 
FAILURE TO DEPOSIT NEGOTIABLE WATER 
STOCK INTO ESCROW. The record and testimony of 
plaintiffs' witnesses clearly demonstrate that all of the 
water stock was not in the escrow in the proper names 
until April 4,1973. Even today, it has not all been prop-
erly endorsed! Of the total number of shares deposited 
in the escrow, 6 shares were deposited March 15, 1971, 
and ten shares were delayed until April 3, 1973. 
EFFECT OF DEFAULT ON THE PART OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. In the case of Leavitt vs. Blohm (1960), 
11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190, referred to above, the 
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court had occasion to determine the effect of the ven-
dor's failure to perfect his title before attempting to 
default the purchaser. The court stated on page 193: 
" It is to be kept in mind that the obligations 
of such contract run both ways. It is true that 
if the buyer fails to make his payments he cannot 
enforce his rights. By the same token, if the 
seller fails to meet his commitment he likewise 
cannot expect the buyer to perform. An impor-
tant attribute of the ownership of real property 
and one of the things for which Mrs. Blohm was 
paying, was the right to the quiet and peaceable 
enjoyment of it. She had the right to look to the 
Leavitts not to leave her vulnerable to being dis-
turbed therein. Her responsibility to make pay-
ments to them was dependent upon their fulfill-
ment of this duty to her." Emphasis added. 
Leavitt was the assignee of the seller's interest, and 
Blohm the assignee of the buyers interest in a contract 
to purchase the El Rancho Motel in Heber, Utah. The 
series of conveyances are rather confusing, but the sub-
stance of the facts as they applied at the trial was that 
the assignee of the sellers interest, Leavitt, was appar-
ently unable to extricate himself from difficulty and 
was about to be forfeited out of his interest by the orig-
inal owner, thereby terminating any equitable interest 
Blohm had in the property. The court held that this po-
tential was not an excuse for failure to pay on the part 
of the defendants, but that before Leavitt could default 
Blohm, Leavitt must clear title and tender a good deed 
to Blohm. In other words, the failure on the part of one 
party did not excuse the failure on the part of the other, 
but that before either could enforce the contract, that 
party had to tender full and complete performance. 
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In Sorensen vs. Larue, (Idaho 1927), 252 P. 494, the 
court stated that the vendor must furnish good title as 
of the date required by the contract, and failing to do 
so, even though the buyer was admittedly unable to 
make the payments, vendor could not default the vendee 
and bring suit for foreclosure. In other words, he must 
tender performance as required by the contract before 
he can default the vendee, even though the vendee be 
actually in default himself, and unable to make the pay-
ments. See also Moter vs. Hershey, (S.D. 1925), 205 
N.W. 239; Kessler vs. Pruitt (Idaho 1908), 93 P. 965; 
Roberts vs. Braffett (Utah 1907), 22 Utah 51, 92 P. 789; 
Ontjes vs. Thomas, 187 N.W. 726 (S.D. 1922); Major-
Blakeney Corp. vs. Jenkins (Calif. 1953), 263 P.2d 655; 
Coy Brown vs. Harold H. and Clarice D. Griffin (Mont. 
1968), 436 P.2d 695; Carroll vs. Scott (Iowa 1919), 170 
N.W. 790, all standing for the proposition that the ven-
dor must tender merchantable title, as shown by the ab-
stract, before he can default the vendee. 
Although it is the general rule in most circumstances, 
that the vendor is obligated to make title only at the 
time fixed for the payment of the last installment, or 
at the time fixed by the contract, he is, nevertheless, by 
the authority of the preceding cases, required to make 
title, and cure all of his own defects, before he can de-
fault the purchasers. This is especially required of 
Bagnall where he has, in effect, demanded the last pay-
ment when he demanded the entire balance due under 
the contract. In addition, the courts uniformly hold that 
the covenants in the warranty deed are breached at the 
time the deed is executed and delivered. In the instant 
case, then, the time for Bagnall to make title would have 
been at the time the warranty deed was executed and 
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delivered to the escrow. The modification agreement 
supports this timing. The agreement could not possibly 
contemplate placing the deed in escrow at the time of 
the making of the last payment, else why the escrow. 
In addition, the letter of July 18 requires Bagnall to 
supply an up to date abstract, and (buyers contend) title 
opinion, neither of which was complied with before com-
mencing suit herein, nor had they properly endorsed and 
deposited all of the water stock, and etc. 
In the Idaho case of Sorensen vs. Larue, discussed 
briefly above, the contract called for the purchaser to 
make certain installment payments amounting to some 
$36,370 plus interest. The last installment of $8,000 was 
due March 5, 1922. The vendor was to furnish an ab-
stract of title fifteen days before the last installment 
was paid showing title free and clear except for certain 
designated encumbrances. The vendor did not tender 
the abstract until after March 5, and the purchaser did 
not tender the final payment at all. In fact, on February 
27, he advised the vendors that he could not make the 
payment and proposed alternate arrangements. 
The vendor, after the time fixed by the agreement, 
tendered the abstract which the purchasers then objected 
to on the ground that there were defects in the title. The 
seller took no steps to clear the title and at all times in-
sisted that the title offered was sufficient and in com-
pliance with the contract. The buyers made no tender 
of the final payment at any time. Action was brought 
to forfeit, and the purchaser defended on the ground 
that the sellers had not tendered an abstract showing 
good and sufficient title as required by the contract. 
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After trial it was determined that there were, in-
deed, defects in title as shown by the abstracts, and the 
vendors were allowed a number of months to clear them 
up. The trial court thereafter determined that the title 
was good, and allowed the purchasers 7 months in which 
to raise the final payment. When payment was not made 
within the 7 months, the court entered a decree of for-
feiture from which the defendant appealed. The entire 
decision is recommended to the Court for careful study. 
The decision, as it applies to Bagnall vs. Suburbia, can 
be summed up by two headnotes on page 494 as follows: 
"Purchaser need not tender payment if vendor is un-
able to furnish abstract required by contract" and 
"Counsel's admissions of purchaser's inability to make 
payments after purchaser had right to refuse to make 
payments are immaterial.'' The court further held that 
the vendor must furnish good title as of the date re-
quired by the contract, that the tender of such an ab-
stract was a condition precedent to defaulting the pur-
chaser, and that until the vendor had complied with his 
obligations under the contract, the purchaser was under 
no duty to tender payments, as such tender would be 
useless until the plaintiff had corrected his defaults. 
In the case of Roberts vs. Braffett (Utah 1907), 22 
Utah 51, 92 P. 789, the court held that: 
"Where time is of the essence of a contract 
of sale of real estate, but neither party exercised 
his right to declare an end to the contract, the 
vendor cannot, when the stipulations of the con-
tract are mutual, dependent, and concurrent, le-
gally place the other party in default until he 
himself had tendered performance by tender of 
a deed, and accounting for the purchase money.'f 
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In Tremonton Inv. Co. vs. Horn (Utah 1921), 202 
P. 547, the plaintiff contracted for the sale of certain 
real property to the defendant. As it later turned out, 
the vendor was himself the purchaser of the land un-
der a prior real estate contract which ultimately went 
into default. When defendants realized the financial pre-
dicament of the seller-plaintiff, they refused to make 
any further payments and the vendor brought action to 
forfeit their contract. The court held that the purchaser 
should be relieved of his default. 
In Stewart Livestock Co. vs. Ostler (Utah 1942), 
144 P.2d 276, the plaintiff-seller had agreed to convey 
title by warranty deed and to deliver an abstract show-
ing "perfect title". The court held that "perfect title" 
meant marketable title as shown by the abstract. As it 
turned out, the plaintiff didn't have title to over 600 
acres of the property but alleged that the defendant's 
title was nevertheless good by reason of adverse posses-
sion, and that they had never been ejected. The court 
held that did not meet the seller's obligations to furnish 
good and sufficient tile, stating that "the mere fact that 
the grantee might actually prevail in litigation against 
the record owner or against any other person, would not 
satisfy the requirement that the grantor convey a mar-
ketable title". 
There remains, of course, the very real problem of 
the .57 acres. United Paint and Colors is the record 
owner and will undoubtedly bring a quiet title action 
against the plaintiffs in the near future. It seems a 
foregone conclusion that they will prevail. Plaintiffs, 
therefore, cannot deliver the dwellings at all, and can 
only deliver a y% interest to the 140.15 acres. These two 
parcels contain all improvements of any significance on 
the property. 
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POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS MADE VALID AND 
TIMELY TENDEE TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
OF ALL DELINQUENCIES DUE UNDEE 
THE CONTEACT 
Under date of July 5, 1969, Eeed E. Maxfield, on 
behalf of Suburbia Land Company, made a tender "of 
any and all amounts that are due J. E. Bagnall under 
the terms of that certain real estate contract dated Sep-
tember 1, 1962". (Exhibit P-15) Plaintiffs then at-
torney, Don V. Tibbs, responded by letter of July 9, 
1969, (Exhibit P-16) demanding "full satisfaction of the 
indebtedness", and declaring that "your proposed par-
tial payments will not be accepted". Again, on July 14, 
1969, plaintiffs California counsel, Cree-L. Kofford, ad-
vised the defendants that the full accelerated balance of 
the contract amounting to $48,535.70, together with taxes 
amounting to $582.93, and certain unspecified sums of 
interest be paid within ten days. After receipt of Mr. 
Tibbs letter of July 9, and prior to receipt of Mr. Kof-
ford 's letter of July 14, Mr. Maxfield again made tender 
to Mr. Tibbs of all amounts now due and all installments 
which hereafter become due. (Exhibit P-18) 
The trial court ruled that the July 5 letter from 
Maxfield on behalf of Suburbia constituted tender le-
gally sufficient to prevent defendant's default and that 
the Tibbs ' letter of July 9, 1969, and the Kofford letter 
of July 14, 1969, constituted rejection of the tender, and 
excused the defendants from further payments on the 
contract until acceptance thereof unless plamtiffs should 
be able to establish that the defendants were unable to 
perform at the time of the tender, or a reasonable time 
thereafter had the tender in fact been accepted. (Pre-
trial order, page 4, paragraph 2, see E ....) 
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Just over one year after Maxfield's tender, the 
plaintiffs, on July 31, 1970, served notice upon Suburbia 
Land Company improperly demanding the entire accel-
erated balance of $48,535.20, together with taxes and un-
specified sum for interest. (Exhibit P-31) The reader 
will recall that the contract does not provide for accel-
eration of the balance upon default. On August 28, 1970, 
Mr. Lester Romero, president of Suburbia Land Com-
pany, again tendered, in writing, "all amounts actually 
due". (Exhibit P-32) The trial court ruled that this 
letter from Mr. Romero constituted tender within the 
30 days provided in the plaintiff's notice of forfeiture 
and was legally sufficient to prevent the defendants' 
default unless the plaintiffs could establish that the de-
fendants were unable to perform at the time of the ten-
der or a reasonable time thereafter, had the tender 
in fact been accepted. (Pre-trial order, page 5, paragraph 
3,R~~) 
As can readily be seen, defendants tendered, in writ-
ing payment of all delinquencies on July 5, 1969, and 
again on July 14, 1969. These tenders were rejected and 
an improper notice of default served upon Suburbia 
July 31, 1970. Thereafter, and within the 30 days pro-
vided in the notice, the defendants again tendered pay-
ment of all delinquencies. The only question left open 
for trial was the question of whether the tenders were 
made in "good faith". The burden of proof was upon 
the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants could not 
perform at the time of the tender or within a reasonable 
time thereafter. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED THE 
TENDERS WERE MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND 
VALID AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as 
follows: 
" 78-27-1. Tender — Offer in writing sufficient. 
— An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of 
money or to deliver a written instrument or spe-
cific personal property, is, if not accepted, equiv-
alent to the actual production and tender of the 
money, instrument or property.'' 
The Utah statute also provides the way in which the 
tenderee may protect himself from the effects of a writ-
ten tender in the event the offer is not made in good 
faith, the offeror cannot produce the money, or the of-
feree has some other valid objection to the tender. 
"78-27-3. Objection to tender — Must be speci-
fied or deemed waived. — The person to whom a 
tender is made must, at the time, specify any ob-
jection he may have to the money, instrument or 
property, or he is deemed to have waived it; and, 
if the objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of 
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or 
kinds which he requires, or he precluded from 
objection afterwards.'' Italics added. 
In other words, defendants' offer, in writing to pay 
"any and all amounts that are due to J. B. Bagnall", 
is equivalent to the tender of the actual money. There 
is no other way in which the statute can be read. Even 
if we concede, for the sake of argument, that the de-
fendants could not produce the money if the tender had 
been accepted, there is no mischief done by accepting 
the statute on its face, i.e., that the defendants' written 
tender is equivalent to the actual production of the 
money, and that it is equivalent irrespective of their 
ability to produce it. 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under the Common Law, it was necessary to ac-
tually have the money in sight at the time the tender 
was made. Such a requirement, in the light of modern 
day business methods, is not only cumbersome and im-
practical, but completely contrary to the normal expec-
tations and practice of the business community. The 
statute was designed to remedy this anomaly. Under the 
statute, a businessman, consistent with his normal ex-
pectations, can make an offer in writing. Such an offer 
fixes the legal rights of the parties until such time as 
it is accepted or rejected. In the event that it is ac-
cepted, normal business practice would dictate that the 
offeror be given enough time to produce the funds in 
the normal course of business. Or, if the offeree so 
chooses, he probably can insist upon virtual instant pro-
duction upon acceptance. In the Bagnall case, however, 
not only was the offer not accepted, it was rejected and 
an improper demand made for the entire contract bal-
ance together with interest, taxes, and etc. 
If plaintiffs had, in good faith, actually intended 
to extend to the defendants the opportunity to pay the 
valid delinquencies, or even the opportunity to pay the 
improper and excessive amounts demanded in their 
notice, it would have been simple enough for them to 
have accepted the defendants' tender. Upon acceptance, 
the financial condition and ability of the defendants to 
produce would have been almost instantaneously appar-
ent. If they could produce, they would do so. If they 
could not, it would become immediately apparent. 
On the other hand, had the plaintiffs found any rea-
son to object to the tender, or if they believed the de-
fendants unable to produce, they could have made ob-
jection as provided in 78-27-3. The cases of Hymas vs. 
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Bamberger (1894), 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202, and Sieverts vs. 
White (1954), 2 Utah 2d. 351, 273 P.2d 974, support this 
contention. The Hymas court said that "To have the 
effect of a valid tender, the party tendering must have 
the ability to produce it, and must act in good faith". 
Without more, this statement would seem to belie the 
defendants? position herein, but it is actually supportive 
of the defendants when the entire decision is considered. 
Obviously a tender in writing cannot forever forestall 
the offeree from asserting his legal rights if the party 
making tender cannot produce. Everyone would agree 
to that. It is the application of the statute that is im-
portant however. The Hymas court goes on to state that 
if the offeree " accepts, and the debtor fails to produce 
the money, his tender will be of no avail". Certainly 
that is so, and the Hymas case charts the course which 
the two parties must follow. 
In Hymas, the tender was made and accepted. 
Thereafter, the offerer was unable, even after an ex-
tended period of time, to produce the money. The court, 
quite naturally held that under such circumstances the 
tender failed. That is a long way from saying there 
was any obligation on the offeror to prove his ability 
to perform, if the tender was not accepted. What the 
court said was that if the offer was accepted and THEN 
he was unable to perform, the offer was void. 
The Sieverts case appears at first blush to be con-
trary to the defendant's position until a more critical 
look is taken. Sieverts revolved around a tender made 
by check, and anything said therein is not necessarily 
pertinent to the offer made by the defendants to the 
Bagnalls in this case. It is clear that a check, unless ac-
cepted as payment in and of itself, is not the payment 
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of money, but is merely an order upon the bank instruct-
ing it to pay the money upon presentation. It is, in 
other words a promise to pay money in the future. This 
is completely different from the tender made to the 
Bagnalls, which was a tender under the statute to pay 
any and all amounts due. The statute says that such a 
tender is equivalent to the actual production and tender 
of the money. The statute does not say that the tender 
of a check is equivalent. 78-27-1 refers specifically to 
a particular manner of tender, and does not include the 
tender of a check or negotiable instrument, does not con-
template nor cover the physical tender of goods, and etc. 
It goes solely to the question of a tender in writing to 
deliver the money, check, negotiable instrument, phys-
ical goods, and etc. Section 3 of statute (78-27-3), how-
ever, has a broader and more general application. It 
refers, not only to the tender contemplated in Section 1, 
but to any and all tenders, and it specifically states that 
the objection must be made at the time of the offer or 
it is deemed waived. 
The reader is referred to the concurring opinion of 
Justice Crockett in the Sieverts case. He takes the posi-
tion that even where a tender is made by check, there is 
no necessity that there be funds on deposit at the time 
the check is drawn and delivered. Quoting from page 977 
of the Pacific Reporter, Justice Crockett said: 
' "If such a check were refused there would be 
no practical use of arranging for the money or 
credit to cover it. This might entail considerable 
inconvenience, difficulty or even hardship, to no 
useful purpose. Serious injustices might result 
if the offeree in such a transaction could defeat 
proof of tender simply by showing that the of-
feror had not sufficient funds in the bank to 
cover the check at the time it was offered.'' 
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"* * * If the offeree has failed to state an ob-
jection, or objects on other grounds, it would be 
manifestly unfair to permit him to defeat proof 
of tender by check on the sole ground that there 
were not sufficient funds to cover the check at 
the time tender was made, because the offeror 
may have arranged for payment of the check, if 
it had been accepted. This reasoning is reflected 
in our statute which requires the person to whom 
a tender is made to 'specify any objection' he has 
thereto or be ideemed to have waived it.' " 
Justice Crockett's concurring opinion is actually the 
opinion of the majority of the court. Justices Crockett, 
McDonough and Wade were in agreement as to the 
meaning of the statutes and the effect of the tender by 
check made in that case. Justice Worthen did not par-
ticipate and Justice Henriod had disqualified himself. 
It appears that Judge Dunford, who wrote the opinion, 
was filling in for Henriod, and that the single remain-
ing judge must have concurred with Dunford. It is the 
defendants' contention that the two cases of Hymas vs. 
Bamberger and Sieverts vs. White definitely support 
the proposition that there is, and should be, no require-
ment that the defendants make any showing whatsoever 
that they had the ability to perform their tenders, espe-
cially at this late date, and after express rejection 
thereof by the plaintiffs. The fact that the written ten-
der was made should be, in and of itself, sufficient to 
prevent the plaintiffs from putting the defendants into 
default and should, therefore, defeat their claims for 
relief. 
In the case of Bemice Ulibarri vs. Joseph Christen-
son, et al, (1954) 2 U.2d 367, 275 P.2d. 170, defendant 
accepted a check for $300 in exchange for a release for 
the wrongful death of plaintiff's 17 year old son. In at-
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tempting to avoid the release, plaintiff claimed that the 
check was not legal tender and therefore no considera-
tion had been given for the release. The Utah court 
made short shrift of that contention. Justice Crockett, 
writing for the court quoted 78-27-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as follows: 
" The person to whom a tender is made must, 
at the time, specify any objection he may have 
* * * or he is deemed to have waived it * * *." 
Justice Crockett goes on to say: 
" I t is well settled that a tender by check in 
lieu of cash is sufficient unless it is objected to 
on that ground. No objection was made to the 
check at the time it was delivered. Had it been, 
the defendants would have had an opportunity 
to substitute cash to obviate the objection. In 
the absence of such objection plaintiff cannot 
now complain of failure of consideration because 
it was a check instead of cash, unless the check 
had been presented for payment and dishon-
ored. This was not done. From aught that ap-
pears, if she had presented the check for pay-
ment it would have been paid, and defendants 
now stand ready and willing to see that the 
check is paid so that their part of the bargain 
will be-kept." 
So also in the instant case. It is well settled that 
a written offer to pay money is, if not accepted, the 
equivalent of the actual production and tender of the 
money. No objection was made to the defendants' ten-
der at the time it was delivered. Had it been, the de-
fendants would have had an opportunity to substitute 
cash to obviate the objection. In the absence of such 
objection, the Bagnalls cannot now complain that the 
tender was not made in good faith unless they actually 
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accepted the offer and the defendants did not perform 
on their tender. This was not done. From aught that 
appears, if Bagnalls had accepted the tender of pay-
ment, it would have been paid, and defendants now stand 
ready and willing to see that the tender is paid so that 
their part of the bargain will be kept. 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT INABILITY OF THE 
DEFENDANTS TO PEEFOEM WOULD DEFEAT 
THEIE TENDEES, THE WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE CLEAELY DEMONSTEATES THAT THEY 
WEEE FULLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING HAD 
THEIE TENDEES BEEN ACCEPTED. 
Special interrogatory number 12 of the Special Ver-
dict of the Jury (R-684), asks the following: 
"Do you find by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant Suburbia Land Company of 
Utah, or Eeed E. Maxfield, or Lester E. Romero, 
was not ready, able and willing to pay the delin-
quencies on the contracts, marked Exhibits 3 and 
5, on July 5, 1969, or August 28, 1970?" 
As will be discussed later, the jury in this matter 
was a typical "home town" jury and demonstrated its 
prejudice in favor of their home town people, J. E. and 
Florence Bagnall. Even so, the jury was compelled 
by the evidence adduced at the trial to answer the fore-
going interrogatory in favor of defendants. They had 
to find that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden 
of showing that the defendants could not perform their 
tender. 
All documentary and testimentary evidence adduced 
at the trial shows beyond doubt that the defendants 
could have performed if their tenders had been accepted 
by the plaintiffs. Judge Don V. Tibbs was called as a 
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witness for the plaintiffs. He had acted as their lawyer 
at the time the Modification Agreement was signed in 
1962. On cross examination he was asked about the 
money displayed by Mr. Maxfield during the negotia-
tions, and responded as follows: (T-99) 
"A My recollection is that Mr. Maxfield came 
in some bib overalls, farm overalls, and they were 
big and, of course, I didn't know him and he sat 
down and I told him that he was going to have 
to have some money and he started to bring out, 
as I recall, tens and twenty dollar bills in sacks." 
'' Q Bringing them out of where ?" 
. " A Oh, every place that you could imagine, out 
of those overalls and I didn't think that there 
was that much money that came in overalls, if I 
may put it that way." 
Mr. Bagnall, on cross examination (T 21, 22), testi-
fied that during the negotiations preceding the sign-
ing of the 1962 modification agreement, Mr. Maxfield 
came to the meeting in Mr. Tibbs office with a suitcase 
full of money. He states that the suitcase was longer, 
wider, and thicker than an attache case and appeared 
to be full of bills: "More bills than I had ever seen in 
my life, either before or since, in bundles about so large." 
Mrs. Bagnall also verified that there had been such a 
suitcase full of money. (T-158) 
What monies were available in 1962, of course, have 
no bearing upon what monies were available in 1969 
and 1970. It is evident, however, that Maxfield was in 
the habit of keeping large sums of money in cash, and 
of dealing directly in cash rather than with checks or 
some of the more conventional means of handling large 
sums. Such a peculiarity is consistent with his testi-
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mony, and the testimony of his wife Mildred, that they 
kept large sums of cash around the house, and that they, 
in fact, had sufficient cash on hand to pay the delin-
quencies of $15,000.00 or more when the tenders were 
made. (T-329,320)
 : . . _ 
Mr. Maxfield testified (T-330, 331) that in addition 
to other sums on hand in 1969, he had, prior to making 
the July 5 tender, obtained a loan commitment from the 
Clearfield State Bank for $15,000.00 to be used along 
with the other funds to pay the contract off in full if 
necessary. Mr. Bruce Watkins, manager of the Sunset 
Branch of the Clearfield State Bank confirmed that a 
loan commitment had been made for the sum of $15,000.00. 
(T-229) 
Mr. Lester Ralph Romero testified that he was the 
owner of the Poor Boy Cafe (T-365) and the Airport 
Motel (T-365, 366) in Salt Lake City, and that his assets 
were available to back up the tenders, both in 1969, and 
in 1970. The objective evidence also leads inexorably 
to the conclusion that the defendants were able to pro-
duce the monies necessary to perform their tenders had 
such tenders ever been accepted. Exhibit D-46, a thrift 
certificate from Interlake Thrift dated October 23, 1969, 
in the amount of $10,000.00, and Exhibit D-47, a thrift 
certificate from Interlake Thrift bearing the date of 
October 26, 1971, in the sum of $9,000.00 amply verify 
the ability of Mr. Romero to meet the terms of the tender. 
In contrast to the compelling evidence adduced by 
the defendants of their ability to perform their tenders, 
the plaintiffs produced only the unsubstantiated testi-
mony of Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall that sometime between 
July 5, 1969, and July 9, 1969, they went out to the 
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ranch in Chester and talked to Eeed and Mildred Max-
field, told them they were delighted to accept their 
tender, and had come for the money. Bagnalls testified 
that Reed Maxfield offered them cemetery lots and some 
wholesale grocer stamps, etc., and refused to pay the 
money. (T-150). Such testimony by them is unsupported 
by anything other than their naked word, and is in total 
contradiction to the written rejections by Tibbs and Kof-
ford, and contrary to their stipulation that none of the 
tenders were ever accepted. This stipulation was made 
by them and by their counsel in their presence at one of 
the pre-trial conferences and was embodied in the pre-
trial order on page 9, paragraph 15 as follows: 
" Plaintiffs have not, at any time, accepted any 
of the various written tenders made on behalf of 
the defendants beginning with the July 5, 1969 
letter of Mr. Maxfield to the present time." 
Faced with such contradictory positions by the 
plaintiffs, and in the light of the compelling evidence 
adduced by the defendants, the jury could only come to 
the conclusion they did, i.e., that the plaintiff had not 
proved the defendants unable to perform their tenders. 
The plaintiffs having failed to establish the defendants 
inability to perform, the finding must be that the tenders 
were good. The trial judge, however, had even more com-
pelling evidence which mandated judgment in favor of 
the defendants rather than the plaintiffs. On Septem-
ber 27, 1972, the defendants made a proffer of proof 
to Judge Erickson at a hearing upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. The proffer consisted of certain cer-
tificates of deposit in the name of Ralph Romero total-
ing $80,000.00. The certificates antedated the tenders 
made by Mr. Romero of August 28, 1970. This proffer 
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is embodied in Judge Erickson's unsigned order of Oc-
tober 11,1972. (R-....) 
In other words, the record, as available to the trial 
judge required that he find the tenders good, and enter 
judgment for the defendants. To grant the plaintiffs' 
motion for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was 
clearly wrong, contrary to all credible evidence, against 
the weight of the evidence, and an abuse of discretion, 
if indeed he had any discretion at all on this point. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS WAIVED TENDER BY RE-
FUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS AN AC-
COUNTING, BY REJECTING THEIR WRIT-
TEN TENDERS, AND BY DEMANDING 
THE ENTIRE CONTRACT BALANCE 
On July 5, 1969, Reed R. Maxfield, on behalf of 
Suburbia Land Company, made a written tender of "any 
and all amounts that are due to J. R. Bagnall under 
the terms of that certain real estate contract dated Sep-
tember 1, 1962." (Exhibit P-15). In response thereto, 
plaintiff's attorney, Don V. Tibbs, notified the defend-
ants that their partial payments would not be accepted 
and demanded full satisfaction of the indebtedness. (Ex-
hibit P-16) Mr. Bagnall testified at the trial that "We 
were asking at that time for the entire contract." (Line 
25, T-37). Plaintiff then enumerates some of the prob-
lems he was allegedly having over the property after 
which the following colloquy took place: 
"Q In other words, at this point you were to-
tally fed up, is that correct? 
" A We were totally fed up. Thank you for fur-
nishing that word for me. 
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"Q All right. And it was your desire to re-
possess the property at that time? * 
; " A That is t rue." 
Then on pages 41 and 42 of the transcript, quoting 
from the questions and answers given at plaintiff's de-
position, the following question was asked about the 
amount demanded by Tibbs' July letter and received the 
following answer: 
"Q You don't know how much is being de-
manded here ? 
"A The amount being demanded there would be 
the total amount of the contract, plus that which 
was in arrears plus the interest on the total con-
tract plus the interest on the amount that was in 
arrears plus the default in taxes and so forth, 
that we had paid out. That comes roughly to 
what it would be.'' 
Plaintiff then attempts to explain that he misinter-
preted the letter when asked about it at the deposition. 
The fact remains, however, that even plaintiff assumed 
the letter was a demand for the entire balance due until 
he realized, in preparation for the trial, that such a de-
mand was improper at that time, and then attempted 
to change his testimony. There is no question about 
Maxfield's interpretation that it was a demand for the 
entire contract balance. All parties testified that within 
a day or two after the July 5 letter, plaintiffs met with 
the Maxfields at the ranch in Chester. Plaintiffs claim 
that they came to accept the tender, defendants claim 
that they demanded the property back and refused to 
accept payment of the delinquent installments. It is quite 
evident the testimony given by J. B. Bagnall at his de-
position more accurately depicts what happened, i.e. that 
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they wanted the entire contract balance. Exhibit P-18, 
a letter from Suburbia by Reed Maxfield dated July 15, 
1969, again tenders the delinquencies and protests the 
attempt to accelerate. 
" I do not believe under the circumstance and in 
view of the conversations, negotiations and agree-
ments that Bagnall is entitled to declare the un-
paid balance due and payable particularly with-
out notice or reasonable opportunity to remedy 
any default that may exist. Please reconsider my 
tenders and advise.ry 
Mrs. Bagnall testified on cross examination (R-166, 
lines 1 through 19) that after departing from the meet-
ing with the Maxfields at the ranch and upon the ad-
vice of counsel, they determined not to accept anything 
less than the entire accelerated contract balance. It is 
also evident from the testimony of Mr. Bagnall on cross-
examination (T-108 & 109) that the Maxfields were told 
by Mrs. Bagnall that plaintiffs did not want the money, 
they wanted the land back. That statement was made, 
according to J. R. Bagnall, at the ranch in Chester right 
after July 5, 1969, tender, or at the home of Mrs. Bag-
nail's brother in Midvale at about the time the 1970 
notice of default was served, and is consistent with the 
testimony of Reed Maxfield that they refused to accept 
the money and demanded the land back. (T-299) 
All of the foregoing, together with the fact that 
plaintiffs refused, without any justification, to give de-
fendants an accounting or to tell them the amount of the 
delinquency, excuses the defendants from making any 
tender at all. Defendants could not make a tender of 
money because they had no way of knowing the amount 
due. Their written offer to pay the delinquencies if 
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plaintiffs would just tell them how much was rejected 
both verbally and in writing, and finally, plaintiffs re-
jected their obligations under the contract by refusing 
to accept payment of the delinquencies by demanding 
the entire contract balance, and by telling defendants 
that they did not want the money, but wanted the land 
back. Under such circumstances, any tender by the de-
fendants, even if it had been a tender of the actual money 
would have been a vain and useless act. The law does 
not require the doing of a vain and useless thing. Veigh 
Cummings et. al. vs. J. Elmo England, et al., (1961) 12 
U.2d. 69, 362 P.2d 584. See also 52 AM. Jur. Tender, 
pages 216, 217, Sec. 4; Thomas vs. Johnson (1919) 55 
Utah 424, 186 P. 437; Evans vs. Houtz (1920), 57 Utah 
216,193 P. 858. 
In the case of Evans vs. Houtz (1920), 57 Utah 216, 
the court said: "Where defendants repudiated a con-
tract for the sale of lands, and announced that they 
would not accept, such conduct was a waiver of formal 
tender.'' See also Thomas vs. Johnson, 186 P. 437; 
Pool vs. Motter, 185 P. 714; Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 
Utah 169, 129 P. 619; Obrecht vs. Lamd & Water Co., 44 
Utah 270, 140 P. 117. In the Evans case, Houtz entered 
into a contract to sell certain land and water stock to 
Evans. When it came time for Evans to make the final 
payment, the land had increased in value and Houtz 
refused to allow the escrow to deliver the deed, stating 
that she would not accept the money and declaring that 
the land and the water stock belonged to her. 
In Cummings vs. England (1961), 12 U.2d 69, 362 
P. 2d 584, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement to 
purchase an undivided one-half interest in a ranch in 
Summit County which the defendants were purchasing 
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on contract. The agreement with plaintiffs provided for 
certain penalties upon default of payment, including the 
forfeiture of plaintiffs interest under the contract. Pay-
ments of $1,500 were to be made semi-annually by the 
plaintiffs on the 1st of April and October, and provided 
for a 30 day grace period. Plaintiffs did not make the 
October payment when due, and on October 28 (still 
within the 30 day grace period) defendants informed 
plaintiffs that they were dissatisfied with the arrange-
ment and would exercise their option under the contract 
to buy plaintiffs out, "unless conditions changed and 
the parties could come to some satisfactory solution." 
The grace period passed and the defendants then noti-
fied plaintiffs that they were terminating the contract 
for failure to make the October payment on time. Cum-
mings then tendered the $1,500 and took the position 
that the contract was still in force. 
The supreme court agreed with the trial court tak-
ing the position that 
" Under such circumstances it was reasonable for 
appellants to conclude that no further payments 
from them under the contract would be expected 
or accepted by respondents, and appellants were 
therefore excused from making a tender of the 
payment within the 30-day grace period. It fol-
lows respondents therefore did not have the right 
to terminate the contract for failure to make this 
payment, since the law does not require the doing 
of a vain and useless thing/9 Italics added. 
In other words, although appellants did in fact 
make a tender after the 30 day grace period, no tender 
was required at all, since the respondents had already 
made it clear they would not accept it in any event. See 
also the case of Thomas vs. Johnson (1919), 55 Utah 424, 
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186 P. 437, where the vendor refused to tender the re-
quired abstract and repudiated the contract. The court 
stated that a tender of the purchase price " would have 
been an idle ceremony. The law never compels a person 
to do that which is vain or useless." 
In the case of Aus vs. Rosenbaum the vendor re-
fused to give the vendee an accounting of the balance 
due. The vendees never made a formal tender and ap-
parently brought an action against the sellers to compel 
an accounting. The vendors claimed forfeiture by fail-
ure to make a formal tender. The court found on page 
558 of Vol. 21, Southern Reporter, that since the ac-
counts had never been furnished to the purchasers " I t 
was impossible for them to know what amount was due, 
and equally impossible for them to tender an unknown 
sum. Finding that tender had been waived by the sellers, 
the court asks: ' ' Shall any man be required by any rule 
to perform an impossible act ?'' And so on ad infinitum. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
IS DEFECTIVE AND CANNOT FORFEIT 
OR TERMINATE THE INTEREST OF THE 
DEFENDANTS UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
STRICT PERFORMANCE HAD BEEN WAIVED. 
The trial court ruled, and the evidence amply supports 
that ruling, that all parties to the contract and modifi-
ca agreement waived the time of the essence provisions 
of the modification agreement and waived strict com-
pliance with the terms of the agreement. Having once 
waived strict compliance, the plaintiffs are required to 
give the defendants reasonable notice to cure the de-
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faults and to give them notice of their intention to hold 
them to strict compliance in the future. The Utah court 
has spoken conclusively on this question in the case of 
Pacific Development Company vs. Stewart, 113 IT. 403, 
195 P. 2d 745, wherein the court held that once having 
waived strict performance, the vendor had the duty of 
giving the purchasers a reasonable notice before they 
could insist on strict performance by the purchasers. 
The Bagnalls therefore cannot default the defendants 
until they have given them notice of their intention to 
hold them to strict performance in the future, and have 
afforded them a reasonable time in which to cure the. 
defaults. 
PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF DEFAULT FATAL-
LY AMBIGUOUS. It is the defendant's position that 
the May 25, 1970 notice which the plaintiffs rely upon 
to establish their right to default the defendants was 
fatally ambiguous. As is evident from the pleading and 
testimony at the trial, the amount of any default was 
hotly contested and was, according to the defendant, no 
more than $13,977.28 (R-370) or even nothing at all. 
Even after trial, the court was unable to establish what 
the amount of default was, finding only that it was "in 
excess of $15,000 as of July 9, 1969." (R-713) Under 
such circumstances, plaintiffs certainly had an obliga-
tion to tell the defendants what amounts would satisfy 
their demand to cure the defaults. 
Had the plaintiffs demanded something in the vi-
cinity of $14,000 to $16,000, defendants would at least 
have had some idea what would be necessary in order 
to cure the "default" even if they were to pay it under 
protest. The contract and modification agreement con-
tained no acceleration clause allowing for a demand for 
41 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the full purchase price upon default by the purchaser, 
yet the notice relied upon by the plaintiffs, indeed all 
of the demands by the plaintiffs, demanded the full bal-
ance of $48,535.70, together with taxes and an unspeci-
fied sum of interest. The general rule is that a written 
notice should be clear, definite, and explicit, and not am-
biguous. A notice that is ambiguous, misleading and un-
intelligible to the average person who is to be affected 
by it is insufficient. 55 Am. Jur., "Vendor and Purchaser'' 
p. 505; Holly Dev. Inc. vs. Board of County Commis-
sioners, 140 Colo. 95, 342 P.2d 1032; Shuey vs. Hamilton, 
(Montana, 1963) 381 P. 2nd 482. It is evident that the 
notice served by the Bagnalls did not apprize the de-
fendants of what would be demanded of them in order 
to avoid default, and in fact, demanded over two and 
one-half times the amount actually due. 
AMOUNT OF DEFAULTS UNKNOWN TO DE-
FENDANTS. It is equally obvious that defendants 
could not have obtained the amount of default from 
their own records, nor from the records of the escrow. 
Mr. Edgar Anderson, escrow officer for the bank, testi-
fied (T-45) that he could not tell the buyer what the 
taxes, insurance, and water assessments were. Appar-
ently the buyer would have to check with Bagnalls, or 
make separate inquiries of the two water companies for 
the water assessments, inquiries of the county assessor 
for the taxes, and inquiries to Bagnall for the insurance 
premiums. In regard to any inquiries to Bagnall, it 
must be remembered that, by their tenders, and by other 
correspondence defendants had, in fact, inquired of 
Bagnalls and were met with an outright rejection and 
refusal to disclose the amount due. Taking even the most 
charitable view of the evidence, no one but the Bagnalls 
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could have told the defendants the amount of unpaid 
insurance, since only they themselves would know that. 
The Utah court, in the case of Romero vs. Schmidt 
(1969) 15 U2d 300, 392 P. 2d. 37 held that such an un-
reasonable refusal on the part of the vendor, excused the 
purchaser from even making a tender, and voided the 
vendor's notice of default. 
Compounding these difficulties, however, is the fact 
that there is absolutely no way the defendants could 
determine the amount of unpaid installments, taxes, and 
etc., which would be necessary to forestall the notice of 
default by the plaintiffs. Even the plaintiffs themselves 
were unsure of the amount of default. In their amended 
complaint they pleaded default from and after March 
20, 1968 (or apparently so), claimed the amount of de-
linquencies to be $48,535.70, taxes of $820.20 together 
with $151.00 interest thereon, and an unspecified sum 
for taxes and for interest on the principal. Yet at the 
trial they introduced evidence of alleged delinquencies 
going all the way back to December of 1962, amounting 
to something "in excess of $15,000.00" (Exhibit P-37 and 
B-713). 
On the other hand, the defendants had every reason 
to believe that the obligation to make up many of the 
alleged delinquencies had been forgiven. The long lapse 
of time (from December, 1962 to July, 1969) alone would 
be sufficient reason to believe that many of the defaults 
had been forgiven. The plaintiffs' own objective evi-
dence supports the defendants' contention that arrange-
ments were made from time to time to reinstate the 
contract after admitted defaults. See for example Ex-
hibit P-48, wherein the plaintiffs, by and through their 
attorney, Don V. Tibbs, state that they were " willing 
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to go along with the matter," provided the back taxes 
were paid and "the payments are made monthly 
promptly, as required by the contract." It is obvious 
from the content of the letter, written October 29, 1965, 
that plaintiffs were complaining about unpaid install-
ments and unpaid taxes. Even a cursory glance at Ex-
hibit P-l l and P-13 shows that the taxes were paid there-
after as requested and that regularly monthly payments 
were made in the succeeding months. In other words, 
the plaintiffs had waived their right to insist upon pay-
men of installments prior to October 29, 1965. Even if 
they had not, they had put defendants into a position 
that they could not know, in July, 1969, and October, 
1970, whether they would be required to pay those in-
stallments or not. With such uncertainty of the amount 
due, the defendants ought not to be required to pay an 
uncertain and unspecified amount at the risk of having 
that forfeited too if it should turn out that they had 
underpaid because of the uncertainty, or if it should 
later turn out that the plaintiffs demand for the accel-
erated balance was, in fact, correct. Under such uncer-
tainty, the plaintiff's notice of default must properly set 
forth the amount they are demanding in order to avoid 
default. 
The Montana court in the case of Radar vs. Taylor, 
333 P. 2d 480 voided a notice of default which demanded 
the accelerated balance due when the contract did not 
provide for acceleration, and, among other reasons given 
for its decision stated at page 487: 
"Furthermore, defendants ought not to be re-
quired to pay the $13,000 which is admittedly due 
and which was correctly demanded in the notice 
at the risk of having it forfeited too, in the event 
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that it should finally be held as contended by 
plaintiffs that the contract contained an accelera-
tion clause." 
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEFAULT INVALID 
BECAUSE IT DEMANDED MORE THAN WAS 
DUE. The plaintiffs notice of default is fatally defec-
tive and invalid for the reason that it makes an im-
proper demand for payment of the accelerated balance 
amounting to a sum over two and a half times the amount 
actually found to be due by the court. It is true that 
the demand for taxes and interest may be correctly set 
forth therein, and it was this fact that the trial court 
relied upon when it found the notice to be effective (Pre-
trial order Page 3, paragraph 1 R ....). Those amounts 
pale into insignificance, however, in comparison with 
the demand for the whole of the principal balance due. 
The Iowa court in the case of Gibson vs. Thode, 328 N.W. 
91, enunciated the reason and the purpose for the notice : 
"The real purpose of a notice of this kind is to 
bring home to the vendee the very reason for the 
notice of foreifture, in other words, to advise the 
vendee what he must do to avoid the forfeiture; 
* * *." (Emphasis added) 
The defendants in the instant case certainly were 
not advised of what they must do. If they paid at all, 
they paid at their peril. If they miscalculated and paid 
too little, they ran the risk of having that amount also 
forfeited. If they paid too much, or paid as demanded, 
they would be making an admission of liability there-
fore, even if they did not owe it, and they could not 
recover it back even if they should later prevail in a 
lawsuit. 
The courts are divided on the effect of such an ex-
cessive demand. The Utah court, however, has found 
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such a notice to be defective and insufficient to effect a 
default under the contract. The case of Wayne E. Car-
roll vs. Phil M. Birdsoll (1970) 24 U 2d 411, 473 P 2d 
398, is self explanatory. 
"The defendants, though questioning it, appear 
to have been in default and behind in their pay-
ments, at least during most of over 13 years, 
when, on March 12, 1968, the seller served a writ-
ten notice on defendants to 1) pay up the delin-
quencies which the notice said amounted to $2,-
175.00 (which defendants emphatically denied to 
be the case), for $150 per month future monthly 
payments, for an unspecified sum for costs and 
expenses, and $475.00 attorneys fees, all "in ac-
cordance with the terms'' of the contract else suit 
would follow to recover under the statutes. It is 
obvious that the notice given required the buyers 
to do something other than "In accordance with 
the contract," namely, that as a condition of keep-
ing possession, the buyers would have to pay 
$150, instead of $100, per month in the future, 
would have to pay an unspecified amount of costs 
and expenses and $475 attorney's fees set by the 
sellers themselves. It is equally obvious that such 
a notice could not possibly convert buyers into 
tenants at will, since it required the buyers to do 
more than that for which the contract called, in-
cluding unascertained costs and pre-determined 
attorney's fees before suit." (Italics added) 
The Bagnall notice likewise required the buyers to 
do something other than in accordance with the terms of 
the contract, namely to pay the accelerated balance. And, 
similarly to Carroll vs. Birdsoll, Bagnall demanded un-
specified interest. It is equally obvious that Bagnalls' 
notice could not possibly put the defendants into default, 
or as staed by the Carroll vs. Birds all court, "convert 
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buyers into tenants at will." The judgment against the 
defendants should, therefore be reversed, and the plain-
tiffs'complaint dismissed. 
POINT V 
BY ACCEPTING PAYMENT ON THE CON-
TRACT AFTER NOTICE OF FORFEITURE 
AND COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT, PLAIN-
TIFFS WAIVED THEIR NOTICE AND RE-
INSTATED THE CONTRACT. 
The modification agreement specifically provided 
that the payments were to be made to the Bank of Eph-
raim. In conformity therewith, the great majority of the 
payments made by defendants after the signing of the 
modification agreement were made to the Bank of 
Ephraim. The agreement provided that plaintiffs were 
to set up the escrow. This they did, by means of an 
"Escrow Receipt." (Exhibit P-14). The only instruction 
contained in that "receipt" is a provision that money 
is to be withheld from the last payment sufficient to pay 
for revenue stamps upon recording. The "receipt" 
acknowledges receipt of the real estate agreement, the 
modification agreement and the warranty deed (Exhibit 
P 7), and agrees to deliver the documents in escrow ac-
cording to the terms of the agreements. Certain under-
standing of the payment terms is then set forth. The 
"Escrow Receipt" is signed on behalf of the Bank of 
Ephraim, and by J. R. Bagnall. Nowhere does the sig-
nature of the purchasers appear (Exhibit P-14). 
Over the years, the bank received certain documents 
which were to be delivered to the defendants upon com-
pltion of the escrow. It received certain correspondence 
from the Bagnalls, and it received payments from the 
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defendants and forwarded them on to the Bagnalls. At 
no time did it ever receive any correspondence from 
the Buyers (Testimony of Edgar Anderson, T-15) or 
anything for delivery to the purchasers — at least noth-
ing to be delivered prior to payment of all of the install-
ments, and etc. 
On December 1, 1971, long after plaintiffs had com-
menced their suit to recover possession of the real prop-
erty, defendants delivered to the escrow, the Bank of 
Ephraim, a monthly payment for $400.00, which sum the 
bank accepted, receipted, posted to interest, and for-
warded to the plaintiffs. (Exhibit D-18). Plaintiffs 
refused the monies and returned them to the bank 
where they were deposited to a checking account opened 
by Bagnall. (Exhibit P-27). It is the defendants' posi-
tion that the acceptance of this payment, after notice 
of default, is wholly inconsistent with a forfeiture, ef-
fectively waived the forfeiture, and reinstated the con-
tract, even if it were conceded that there had been a 
valid forfeiture. 
So also with the notice to quit served upon Reed 
and Mildred Maxfield by mail, August 19, 1971. (See 
Amended Complaint R-95 and Exhibit P-46). The elec-
tion by the plaintiffs to treat the contract as void, evi-
denced by the notice to quit, was wholly inconsistent with 
the notice of forfeiture previously served. If the for-
feiture notice was sufficient to terminate the defend-
ants ' interest in the contract it was effectively waived 
by the inconsistent notice to quit alleging the modifi-
cation agreement void, and constituting a repudiation of 
the agreement. 
The rule is obvious that a vendor cannot claim a for-
feiture and at the same time receive the purchase money, 
and does not warrant a multiplication of authorities. 
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"Accordingly, there can be no doubt that a vendor 
by receiving money when past due is precluded 
from availing himself of any right of forfeiture 
which has arisen because of the failure to pay 
the same on time.'' 55 Am Jur P. 1018. 
See Krell vs. Cohen (1921), 214 Mich. 590, 183 N.W. 
53; Maday vs. Roth, 160 Mich. 291, 125 N.W. 13; Barber 
vs. Stone, 104 Mich. 90, 62 N.W. 139; Patterson vs. Car-
rel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158; RubensUne vs. Powers 
(1921), 215 Mich. 438, 184 N.W. 589; Walter vs. Liever-
man, 214 Mich. 428,183 N.W. 235. 
In the case of Christy vs. Guild (Utah 1942), 121 
P.2d 401, the Utah court found that there had been no 
waiver of the notice of forfeiture by acceptance of pay-
ments because of the special provision against such 
waiver contained in the contract. The court did agree 
with the principle of waiver however. 
Although it has been stated that the escrow "agent" 
is the agent of both parties (and the trial court so ruled), 
it is clear that the "agent", if an agent at all, is a very 
special kind of agent. 28 AM. Jur. 2d, Escrow, Sec. 11 
states: 
" In a broad sense, every depository of an escrow 
is the agent of both parties . . . and he may, there-
fore, be looked upon as a special agent of both 
parties, with powers limited only to those stipu-
lated in the escrow agreement . . . the escrow 
holder is merely a conduit used in the transaction 
for convenience and safety." 
The Restatement of the Law of Agency 2d., Section 
14 D, says that an "escrow holder is not, as such, an agent 
of either party to the transaction until the event occurs 
which terminates the escrow relation." In other words, 
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the escrow is actually a fiduciary, having a fiduciary re-
lationship to each party to the escrow until he comes into 
possession of something which he is obligated to deliver 
to one party or the other. At that time he becomes the 
agent of the party to whom he is obligated to make the 
delivery. It is obvious that the bank was the agent of the 
Bagnalls for the collection and disbursement of the in-
stallment payments. The bank never became the agent 
of the defendants as is demonstrated by determining on 
whom the loss would fall if the bank were to default in 
its obligations or to embezzle the documents or payments. 
If, after delivering a payment to the bank, the money 
should be embezzled, it is clear that the loss would fall 
on the plaintiffs. Having delivered it to the bank, the 
buyers had done all that was required of them under the 
contract, hence the bank must be the agent for the Bag-
nalls, and the loss would fall on them. 
On the other hand, suppose the bank were to embezzle 
the warranty deed. Whose loss would it be? Could the 
plaintiffs avoid executing and delivering another on the 
ground that the escrow was the agent of the buyers-
Certainly not! The water stock? Suppose that were lost 
by the bank prior to payment of the contract in full. 
Obviously Bagnalls again must bear the loss. In what 
way,, then, is the escrow an agent of the buyers herein. 
Prior to payment of the contract in full, have the Bagnalls 
delivered anything to the escrow the title of which passed 
to the buyers ? No! What kind of an agent of the buyers 
is this that holds nothing belonging to them, that, up to 
the present time at least, owes them no duty, and has 
performed no service for them? The trial court was 
clearly in error when it determined as a finding of fact 
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that the escrow was the agent of both parties. As a matter 
of law, it could only be the agent of the Bagnails. 
By service of the May 25, 1970 Notice of Forfeiture, 
the plaintiffs attempted to terminate the real estate 
agreement and the modification agreement, thereby 
effectively terminating the authority of the escrow. They 
neglected to notify the escrow, however, or to in any way 
apprize the Bank of the purported termination of the 
agreements, and the termination of the escrow authority. 
Quite the contrary, long after such purported termina-
tion and after their refusal to acknowledge the receipt of 
the $400.00 payment to the bank, the Bagnalls utilized 
the escrow to their own advantage by attempting to cor-
rect some of their own defaults, i.e., on or about March 
15, 1971, they deposited with the escrow six shares of 
Moroni Irrgaton stock, and on or about Aprl 3, 1973, 
they deposted ten shares of Chester Irrigation stock. 
(Testimony of Edgar Anderson, T-24, Exhibit P-13, 14). 
Such actions by them are totally inconsistent with 
their position that the contract was at an end and the 
authority of the escrow terminated. How can they make 
their payments to the escrow (or, in other words, how 
can they deposit their stock into the escrow), expect to 
bind the defendants thereby, and yet deny the buyers 
the same privilege of paying into the escrow and binding 
the sellers 1 The answer is that they cannot! The case of 
State vs. Walien (Minn. 1932) is illustrative of the prin-
ciple. The court said the principle's "intent not to ratify 
agent's unauthorized acts does not prevent ratification 
by acceptance of benefits with knowledge." The point to 
be made here is that even though he does not want to 
ratify (or acknowledge the authority of the escrow) he 
will be found to have done so where his actions are in-
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consistent with an intent not to ratify. The court further 
stated that the " principal cannot avail himself of the 
unauthorized acts of his agent, so far as it is advantage-
ous to him, and repudiate the obligations. In other words 
he must acknowledge the authority of the bank (as he has 
done by depositing the water stock) or he must deny 
(as he attempted to do by refusing to accept the defend-
ants payments). He cannot have it both ways. 
The Utah court has spoken loudly and clearly on the 
effect of acceptance of payment by the escrow after notice 
of default to the purchaser. In the case of The United 
States of America vs. Colombine Coal Company, No. 
12459, filed February 3, 1972, the United States of 
America brought suit against the Colombine Coal Com-
pany for foreclosure on two notes and the securities 
given therefor. The Economic Development Administra-
tion was the holder for one note in the sum of $325,000, 
and the S.B.A. was the holder of the second note for 
|100,000. The S.B.A., was also the servicing agent for 
both notes. 
The coal company defaulted in the payments on the 
notes, and on December 1, 1969, the plaintiff gave notice 
that pursuant to the provisions in the notes, it was 
accelerating all payments and would thereafter not accept 
past due payments on either of the notes. Apparently the 
plaintiff did not notify the S.B.A. On January 15, 1970, 
the coal company paid to the S.B.A. the sum of $79,226.83 
which was received by the S.B.A., credited to unpaid 
interest and installments on the E.D.A. note and the 
surplus applied to the S.B.A. loan. 
The E.D.A. attempted to disclaim the application of 
the proceeds as credited by S.B.A. Justice Ellett, writing 
for the court, held that the E.D.A. was bound by the ac-
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ceptance and application of the payment by its servicing 
agent the S.B.A. "By accepting payment on delinquent 
interest and principal after notice of acceleration, the 
plaintiff waived its notice and reinstated the loan." 
" I t may be that the Colombine Coal Company is 
now in such arrears that it will not be able to pay 
the two notes, or it might be that if permitted it 
could pay both notes in full. Until a new notice 
.,.., is served upon it, there is no way of knowing that. 
All that we now hold is that by accepting payment 
on delinquent interest and installments after 
notice of acceleration had been given, the plain-
•j ; tiff waived the notice it had given." 
Clearly, then, the Bank of Ephraim acted as agent for 
the plaintiffs only. It never became the agent of the de-
fendant, having only a fiduciary's obligation to deliver 
the deed when the contract was paid in full. The defend-
ants herein, as did the defendant Colombine Coal Com-
pany, knew that the plaintiffs had declared a forfeiture 
at the time payment was made to the escrow. Even so, the 
plaintiff was, and should be, bound by the acceptance of 
the payment by the escrow, thereby waiving the notice of 
forfeiture. See also Damiano vs. Finney (Idaho 1970) 
464P.2d522 
POINT VI 
EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFFS HAD VAL-
IDLY FORFEITED THE CONTRACT, DE- , 
FENDANTS' OFFER TO PAY THE ENTIRE 
CONTRACT BALANCE AND THEIR OFFER 
TO PAY THE SAME INTO THE REGISTRY 
OF THE COURT SHOULD REINSTATE 
THE CONTRACT. 
On September 28, 1972, defendant Lester R. Ro-
mero appeared before Judge Fredinand Erickson to-
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gether with his counsel, Eobert L. Lord, for hearing on 
various motions, including defendants motion to dismiss 
the complaint upon the grounds that valid tender had 
been made. At that time, Mr. Romero had with him sav-
ings certificates of approximately $80,000.00 which were 
proffered to the Court in support of the motion. Judge 
Erickson refused to allow defendant to be heard on the 
motion, and refused to accept the proffer of proof. (See 
Letter of Mr. Lord dated October 11, 1972, and accom-
panying unsigned Order prepared for Judge Erickson's 
signature). 
Defendants did thereafter make written tender of 
the entire contract balance, together with interest, taxes, 
and other sums due under the contract (Pre-Trial Order 
pp. 1 & 2, B~—.). Although it does not appear anywhere 
in the record, it should also be noted that at the pretrial 
conference of September 29, 1973, or possibly one of the 
preceding sessions, defendants' attorney, Robert L. Lord, 
offered on behalf of the defendants, to pay $70,000 into 
the registry of the court to be used if and when the de-
fendants tender of the entire contract balance should be 
accepted and if the court had granted defendants' motion 
for summary judgment. Judge Harding stated in effect 
that that would not be necessary. Thereafter an escrow 
agreement was entered into between GL T. Lisonbee and 
Sanpete Land & Livestock Company wherein $65,000 
worth of savings crtificates were deposited with Valley 
Bank and Trust. (See affidavit of Kerry G-. Judd dated 
February 13, 1975, on file with the Supreme Court). The 
escrow of the certificates was again for the purpose of 
backing up the tender of payment in full. 
While there appears to be little if any functional 
difference between an installment land contract and a 
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purchase money mortgage (both secure payment of un-
paid purchase money, and, until the debt is fully paid, 
the buyer's rights are encumbered by a lien in favor of 
the unpaid seller), nevertheless, seemingly mostly for 
historical rasons, the law of land contracts and the law 
of mortgages have developed along separate lines. As a 
result, the rights of the land contract purchaser are gov-
erned largely by contract principles, while the rights of 
the defaulting mortgagor are governed by equitable 
principles. 
"Thus, while at one time the defaulting mortga-
gor appealed to equity's discretion to allow him to 
redeem, after a time, the mortgagor's 'right' of 
redemption became so well established that the 
defaulting mortgagors did not have to show any 
special equity to invoke equity's power, and in-
stead it became necessary for the mortgagee to 
foreclose the mortgagor's equity of redemption 
because, unless terminated by a court of equity 
(or under a statutory procedure for foreclosure), 
the mortgagor's equity generally continues in-
definitely unbated. In contrast, specific perform-
ances and relief from a forfeiture in the case of 
a defaulting land contract purchaser are discre-
tionary, such purchaser generally having no abso-
lute right of redemption which the vendor must 
foreclose. However, there is some indication of 
movement in the courts in the direction of treat-
ing an installment land contract as substantially 
the equivalent of a mortgage or deed of trust." 
(55 ALE 3d 17, emphasis added) 
See H & L Land Co. vs. Warner (1972, Fla. App.) 
258 So. 2d 293, wherein the court took the position that 
the purchaser and vendor under an installment land 
contract were in essentially the same position as a mort-
gagor and mortgagee. Further on on page 16 of 55 ALR 
3d the annotator states: 
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i
 Thus, it would appear that notwithstanding gen-
eral recognition of the validity of the time-of-
essence and forfeiture provisions of installment 
land contracts, the rights of purchasers to specific 
performance is denied, and forfeiture of past pay-
ments, and improvements permitted, only in those 
instances in which the purchaser cannot, under 
the particular facts of the case, make out a case 
for equitable relief. In the relatively rare in-
stances in which specific performance has been 
denied under circumstances in which the purchaser 
tenders the full amount due, the grounds have 
" often been that the nature of the defaults of the 
purchaser indicated an abandonment of the con-
tract." (emphasis added) 
The courts of many states have seized on almost 
any excuse to avoid a forfeiture. 
For example, the Court of Appeals of Washington 
held in the case of Will Rogers Farm Agency, Inc. vs. 
Stafford (1971) 482 P.2d. 336, that a purchaser in default 
could avoid forfeiture of title under certain circumstances 
by paying into the registry of court an amount sufficient 
to bring the contract payments up to date and reimburse 
plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The 
Washington court had previously held that "Forfei ture 
are not favored in law and are never enforced in equity 
unless the right thereto is so clear as to permit no de-
nia l ." Dill v. Zielbe, 173 P. 2d 977 at 1946. See also 
Knowles v. Anderson 22 P. 2d 657. 
The Utah court has never squarely faced the issue of 
whether a buyer in default will be relieved of a forfeiture 
solely because he tenders payment in full or deposits the 
required amount with the court. The basic rule was laid 
down in the case of Kohler vs. Lundberg (Utah 1919) 
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180 P. 2d, 590. The purchaser of land under an installment 
land contract had defaulted and the seller brought an 
action for forfeiture. There was a dispute as to whether 
the seller had granted an extension of time to make the 
payment. The court held that the forfeiture would not be 
allowed and stated: 
"Courts of equity are loath to enforce a for-
feiture, especially when refusal to do so, as in this 
case, gives to all parties to the agreement every 
right to which they are entitled, and this in no 
way works a hardship upon anyone." 
Two years later Tremonton vs. Home (Utah 1921), 
202 P. 2d 547, was decided. The purchaser had failed to 
make payments due to fear that the vendor could not 
deliver marketable title. The court refused to allow a 
forfeiture, finding that the defendant had been ready and 
willing to pay all amounts due under the terms of the con-
tract and that the same had been declined or refused by 
the plaintiff. 
In 1955 the Utah court refused to allow a forfeiture 
because "refusal to do so * * # works no hardship upon 
anyone." Swain vs. Salt Lake Real Estate, 279 P. 2d 709. 
And finally, in the case of Strand vs. Mayne (1963), 
14 U. 2d 355, 384, P. 2d, 396, the Utah court allowed for-
feiture when a buyer defaulted on his payments, vacated, 
and later brought suit to recover his down payment and 
installments already paid. But Justice Henriod pointed 
out in his concurring opinion that: 
"Had Strand sought specific performances, ten-
dering into court the amount of their delinquent 
payments, the cases cited in the main opinion 
might be aprops. This is not a case where a seller 
is seeking to forfeit out a necessitous buyer under 
a uniform real estate contract, but one where a 
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buyer, showing nothing in the way of excuse for 
not carrying out his part of the contract, seeks to 
recover something from a seller willing to per-
form. * * * (emphasis added) 
For additional references to cases in support of the 
defendants position herein, see Jameson vs. Wurtz 
(Alaska) 396 P2d 68, 74; McCormick vs. Grove (Alaska) 
495 P. 2d 1268; Moran vs. Holman (Alaska) 50- P. 2d 
769; Stockman's Supply vs. Jeane (Idaho 1951), 237 
P. 613; Slobe vs. Kirby Stone, Inc. (Nevada 1968), 447 
P. 2d 491; Barkis vs. Scott (Cal. 1949), 208 P. 2d 367. 
As is readily seen from the above discussion, the 
trend of many modern and progressive courts is to treat 
the installment land contract and the mortgage the same 
way, allowing the defaulting purchaser to reinstate the 
contract or to remedy his default by tendering the de-
linquency, by tendering the entire balance due, or by 
paying the money therefore into the registry of the court. 
Defendants herein, beginning with the first written ten-
der in July, 1969, have repeatedly tendered payment of 
the delinquencies. In each instance the plaintiffs refused 
the tender. As recently as September 28,1972, defendants 
attempted to demonstrate ability to pay with the proffer 
to Judge Erickson, and finally, on July 26, 1973, defend-
ants tendered the entire balance due, and offered to pay 
$70,000 into court to back up the tender. It is evident that 
plaintiffs all along believed, and continue to believe that 
the defendants can, in fact produce the monies to pay 
their tenders, else why have they continually failed to 
accept? 
Here is a perefect opportunity for the court to do 
equity. If the defendants be in default (and it is ve-
hemently denied) they should be relieved of that for-
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feiture* " * * # To do so # * * works no hardship upon 
anyone.'' and all parties will then receive the benefit of 
their bargain. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT EBBED BY ALLOWING THE 
PLAINTIFFS TO PLEAD ALTEB EGO AND, 
AT THE SAME TIME, MAINTAINING IN-
CONSISTENT PBOVISIONS IN THE PBE-
TBIAL OBDEB. 
The pretrial order (B-....) provided that the 1970 
notice of forfeiture upon which the plaintiffs' complaint 
is based, was directed to the Idaho corporation and 
would not be sufficient to terminate the purchasers in-
terest under the contract if the plaintiffs had notice of 
a valid transfer to any of the successor corporations or 
parties. That order stands unchanged to the present 
time and is in direct contradiction to the finding of alter 
ego by the trial court. At the conclusion of the plain-
tiffs ' case, defendant Maxf ield moved for judgment and 
to be dismissed from the action upon the failure of the 
plaintiffs to prove alter ego. The motion was granted. 
Defendants likewise moved for judgment and to have the 
plaintiffs' complaint dismissed for the same reason, 
and in reliance upon the pretrial order. For reasons 
unknown to the writer, that motion was denied. Yet in 
its findings of fact, the trial court found that Beed Max-
field was the central and dominating personality behind 
all of the corporate entities. (Findings of Fact, para-
graph 9) 
In paragraph 2 of page 4 of the pretrial order the 
trial court determined that the July 9, 1969 letter from 
Don V. Tibbs, and the July 14, 1969, letter from Cree-L 
Kofford constituted rejections of defendants July 5 
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tender. In addition the pretrial order stipulated that 
the tender was not accepted (paragraph 15, p. 9). Yet 
the court found in paragraph 14 of its findings of fact 
that the defendants refused to make payments. The 
pre-trial order and the findings are mutually contra-
dictory. 
Paragraph 7, page 5 of the pretrial order states that 
the transfers from the Idaho corporation were valid, 
yet makes a finding that they were void, voidable and 
illegal, (paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact). 
It was the responsibility of the plaintiffs to move to 
amend the pretrial order if they so desired. Not having 
done so, the pretrial order should have governed the 
course of the trial. After having pleaded alter ego, the 
plaintiffs should have been required to amend the pre-
trial order to properly state the issues and the status of 
the case. Defendants, in reliance upon the order, which 
was then almost totally ignored at the trial were prej-
udiced and should be granted judgment in accordance 
with the provisions of the pretrial order. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
The verdict of the jury is confusing, contradictory, 
and contrary to the evidence. Even so, the jury found 
for the defendants upon the critical issue of ability to 
perform their tenders. Defendants moved for judgment 
upon the verdict (even though they were obviously being 
shortchanged on damages for loss of the % interest in 
the 140.15 acres and etc.) or, in the alternative, a new 
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trial. The plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict which judgment was granted by the trial 
court. 
A whole brief could be written pointing out the ob-
vious home town prejudice of the jury as evidenced by 
its wholly illogical answers to the special interrogatories. 
Four short examples will suffice. 
1) In special interrogatory 3, the jury determined 
that the fair market value, as of July 16, 1962, of the 
undivided one-half interest in the 140.15 acre tract of 
land containing 70% of the improvements was $5,600.00. 
By the most liberal interpretation of the 1952 contract 
in the plaintiffs favor, the cost of the raw ground it-
self, without any improvements would have been $93.00 
per acre in 1952, or a value of $6,573, in 1952 and with-
out any improvements. Defendants' evidence showed a 
value in 1962 of approximately $27,000.00! 
2) The jury was made aware of the summary judge-
ment quieting title to the % interest in the 140.15 acres 
in United Paint and Color. The jury was also aware 
that the trial court had ruled that to constitute a defect 
for which the defendants were entitled to damages. Yet, 
in the face of that, they found in an answer to special 
interrogatory number 4 that the plaintiffs had, in fact, 
acquired and maintained marketable title. Such a find-
ing, in the face of the evidence and the court's ruling 
is sheer nonsense and is sufficient, in and of itself to 
show undue prejudice on the part of the jury and against 
the defendants. 
The jury also found that the plaintiffs were not in 
default because of their failure to deposit all water stock 
with the escrow as required by the modification agree-
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ment. For crying out loud! If the plaintiffs do not have 
to comply with their part of the bargain, why, in heavens 
name, must the defendants comply with theirs ? 
3) The jury found, in answer to interrogatory num-
ber 7, that the plaintiffs had no obligation to respond 
to the tender made by Les Romero, even though it was 
timely made and the court had determined it to be valid 
tender (except for the question of ability to perform). 
The law itself, requires a response to a tender, and it is 
so legislated in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-27-3. In 
other words, the jury finding is contrary to the expressed 
will of the legislature. 
4) The jury found (Interrogatories 13 and 14) that 
the railroad right of way and the county road easements 
did not constitute defects in Bagnalls' title. It is obvious 
that they do constitute defects as a matter of law, and 
again demonstrates the bias and prejudice of the jury. 
Even so, the jury found that the plaintiffs had 
failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the defendants were not able to perform their tenders. 
In other words, even granting the jury's bias in favor 
of them, the plaintiffs utterly failed to produce 
any substantial proof on that vital point. It is quite 
clear that, had they produced anything at all, the jury 
would have found in their favor. 
It may well be that the Court should disregard the 
jury verdict in this matter. That is well within its prov-
ince since the jury is advisory only. However, it cannot 
pick and choose. If it disregards any portion of it, it 
must consider anew, all issues raised by the pleadings 
and the testimony. This the court failed to do. Had it 
considered the very compelling evidence that the mod-
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ification agreement should be adjusted downward, by 
some $54,000, and had it made a determination of the 
amount of damages to be awarded for the loss of the 
% interest, for the loss of the county roads, for the loss 
of the railroad right of way, and for the loss of land 
still in the name of J. A. Bagnall, and etc., it could very 
well have determined that, not only was the contract 
not in default, but that the defendants were entitled to 
the warranty deed. 
POINT IX 
PLAINTIFFS' TESTIMONY ON ALL CRU-
CIAL MATTERS IS CONTRADICTORY AND 
AT ODDS WITH THE OBJECTIVE EVI-
DENCE AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED 
A reading of the entire transcript of testimony re-
veals instances in which the plaintiffs themselves are 
in disagreement over simple objective facts. It is ap-
parent that plaintiffs attempted to present their testi-
mony on certain crucial matters in the way they con-
ceived most helpful to their cause. For example, Mr. 
Bagnall testified that the 1962 balance on the contract 
was determined from the rather sketchy records avail-
able to all family members and parties to the contract 
(T-89, 116; Depo. 21, 22). Mrs. Bagnall, on the other 
hand, testified that they maintained a very good set 
of books which were kept by a C.P.A. (T-161, 162). 
Mr. Bagnall positively and definitely stated that 
he had never used his son's name. (T-14, Depo. - 75). It 
turned out that he did, however, and his own documen-
tary evidence contradicts him. The deed of August 13, 
1966, (Exhibit D-22) states that he is sometimes known 
as J.A. Bagnall (his son's name). Plaintiff stated at 
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his deposition that he used that name to clear up the 
title to the land so that they could convey a marketable 
title, if and when the contract was paid (Depo. 75, T-14). 
He actually tried to clear his son's interest in the land 
by his own warranty deed! 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall testified that they had 
never heard of any corporation other than Suburbia of 
Idaho. (T-32). On the other hand, Mr. Tibbs, their 
own lawyer at the time, testified quite definitely that 
they knew of the Nevada corporation at least, and ap-
proved the assignment from the Idaho Corporation to 
the Nevada corporation. (T-83, 84). In addition to Mr. 
Tibbs' testimony, is the simple and compelling fact that 
both plaintiffs signed a deed to the Nevada corporation 
in September, 1965. (Exhibit D-32). Mrs. Bagnall, a 
qualified real estate agent with ten years experience testi-
fied that she did not understand that the deed was to 
the Nevada corporation. Fantastic! 
Plaintiffs claimed ownership to a parcel of 17.45 
acres of land that had been paid for in full in 1962, and 
to which the plaintiffs had issued, and delivered a war-
ranty deed. They entered into an oil lease including the 
17.45 acres and received the rental payments therefore. 
(Exhibit D-34). They sought to forfeit defendants' in-
terest therein as part of the law suit and made claim 
therefore in their amended complaint. (R-96, 117). Mr. 
Bagnall testified at his deposition that he had never 
signed a deed to the property. When shown the deed 
he then backtracked and said that although he had 
signed it he had never delivered it. He vehemently as-
serted that he had never been paid one red cent for the 
17.45 acres. (Depo. 81). At the trial, however, plain-
itff's counsel stipulated that they were making no claim 
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for the 17.45 acres, and the defendants, in fact, intro-
duced receipts showing payment, together with the deed 
from the plaintiffs. (Exhibits D-33, D-39). 
Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall maintained at the trial that 
Maxfield made only one trip to California to see them, 
and that was in 1965. Yet on his deposition he stated 
that Maxfield had been to his home on two or three oc-
casions, and that he had no knowledge one way or the 
other whether he had visited them in 1963 as testified 
to by Maxfield. (T-370, 371, Depo. 70) 
A rather rediculous tale is told by the plaintiffs 
that they went to the ranch in Chester right after the 
July 5, 1969 letter of tender and announced that they 
were there for their money at which time Maxfield of-
fered them some stamps in some type of wholesale groc-
ery business together with some cemetery lots. (T-165). 
All of this in direct contradiction to their own stipula-
tion, entered into by their counsel and them at pre-trial 
conference specifically stating that none of the tenders, 
including the July 5 tender had been accepted, and in 
contradiction to all written demands for payment which 
demanded the whole unpaid balance. 
As was discussed earlier, Mr. Bagnall supports the 
defendants testimony that Mrs. Bagnall stated that they 
did not want the money, they wanted the land back. Mrs. 
Bagnall denied making any such statement. 
And so on. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts in this 
case clearly demonstrate: 
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1) That the plaintiffs themselves were, and are, 
in substantial and serious default under the terms of 
the Real Estate Agreement and the Modification Agree-
ment. They did not put all of the water stock into the 
escrow until 1973. They cannot deliver unencumbered 
title to the five acres consumed by the railroad and the 
county road. They cannot deliver title, of any kind, to 
the .57 acres on which the main dwelling is located. They 
cannot deliver more than a xfa interest in the 140.15 
acres on which all of the rest of the improvements of 
any significance are located. They cannot deliver title 
to the approximately 5 acres owned by J.A. Bagnall, 
plaintiffs' son. 1.5 acres is owned of record by Caroline 
M. Hansen, Eva Josephsen Hansen, and Mark Sharp 
Hansen, The railroad appears to be the fee simple owner 
of a strip of land 1 chain by 40 chains along the eastern 
boundary of the property. Outstanding oil and gas leases 
still appear of record, and, as of the time the plaintiffs 
notified defendants of their alleged default, plaintiffs 
had entered into a new oil and gas lease which was filed 
of record, and they had not cleared the lis pendens 
which they themselves had filed regarding a prior action 
of foreclosure against defendants' assignors. 
Time was made of the essence for both sellers and 
buyers by virtue of the Modification Agreement. Both 
parties waived that provision as a result of their actions, 
once having waived, neither party could put the other 
into default until such party had fully performed all of 
his own obligations. Clearly the plaintiffs could not de-
fault the defendants herein, and the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed, the complaint of the plain-
tiff dismissed, and the matter remanded back to the 
district court for a determination of the balance due 
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under the contract, the offsets and damages to be al-
lowed the defendants, a determination of the amount 
of default, if any, on the part of the defendants, and the 
court instructed to allow a reasonable time for the de-
fendants to pay such defaults, if, indeed they exist at all. 
2) Defendants tender of July 5, 1969, coming before 
the notice of default, and the tender of August 28, 1970, 
coming within the time allowed by the plantiffs' notice, 
constituted timely and valid tender and should, therefore, 
have prevented the plaintiffs' notice of default from 
becoming effective, even if they had a right to default 
the defendants, which they did not. Passing upon the 
weight of evidence in the record, as this Court must, the 
conclusion that the defendants tender was valid is in-
escapable. 
3) After tender by the defendants, the plaintiffs re-
jected those tenders and demanded the whole of the ac-
celerated balance which demand was improper. Having 
rejected the tender and making improper demand for 
payment, their notice was fatally defective and void. 
4) After notice of forfeiture, the escrow, acting as 
agent for the plaintiffs, accepted a payment on the con-
tract and receipted and disbursed the same. That money 
is, even yet, in an ordinary checking account under the 
sole control of plaintiff. Such action clearly waives any 
effect the notice of default may have had. 
5) The defendants have tendered payment in full 
(if anyone can ever figure out what it should be), of-
fered to pay into the registry of the court, were told by 
the trial judge that that would not be necessary, and 
thereafter established an escrow of their own, and de-
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posited the necessary funds therein. If nothing else, this 
alone should be sufficient for the court to "re-instate" 
the contract. 
6) Precedural errors committed by the trial court 
were serious and prejudicial to the defendants, and the 
court's judgment should be reversed. As pointed out 
in Point VII, many of the rulings made at pretrial were 
contradicted by rulings made at the trial. The pre-trial 
order should have governed rather than being simply ig-
nored. 
For each, and for all, of the above reasons, the judg-
ment should be reversed, the complaint dismissed, and 
the matter remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings in accordance herewith. 
Costs and attorney fees should be awarded to the 
Appellants-Defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert L. Lord 
118 Metro Building 
, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suburbia & Romero 
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